The present paper is a modest attempt to examine the last category of transfers that signifies the horizontal imbalance-the equalization grants, which constitute the bulk of the transfers in many federations including India. Such transfers are supposed to be more controversial as they involve the perceived conflict between equity and efficiency and inter se sharing instead of being progressive often becomes more regressive and accentuates regional disparities.
INTRODUCTION
The FC-XIII has recommended fiscal consolidation through the elimination of revenue deficit as the long term target for both the centre and states. It indicated a normative discipline for both centre and states with equal treatment which entailed no automatic priority for any level of Govt. and focuses on equalization. It implies that states and local bodies have the fiscal potential to provide comparable level of public services at reasonably comparable level of taxation. The principle does not guarantee uniformity in public services across the country but it addresses the fiscal requirement of each jurisdiction to enable such uniformity.
Goods and Services Tax (GST) as a game changing tax reform measure will significantly contribute to the buoyancy of tax revenue and acceleration of growth as well as generate positive externalities. FC-XIII proposed a grand bargain. The Six elements of grand bargain for GST included (i) the design, (ii) operational modalities (iii) binding agreement between the centre and states with contingencies for change in rates and procedures (iv) disincentives for non compliance (v) the implementation schedule and (vi) the procedure for states claim compensation. For this purpose the FC-XIII recommended the sanction of Rs. 50,000 Cr. as compensation for revenue losses of states on account of the implementation of GST. This amount would shrink to Rs. 40,000 Cr. If implemented on/ after 18 th April 2013 and further to Rs. 30,000 Cr. if implemented on / after 18th April 2014.
Major Recommendations of FC XIII are Enumerated Below
• The share of states in net proceeds of shareable central taxes shall be 32% every year for the period of the award.
• Revenue accruing to a state is to be protected to the level that would have accrued to it provided Service Tax, a part of sharable central taxes if 88 th Amendment to constitution is notified and followed up by a legislation enabling states to levy service tax.
• Centre to review the levy of cesses and surcharges with a view to reducing their share in its gross tax revenue.
• The indicative ceiling on overall transfer to states on revenue account may be fixed at 39.5% of gross revenue receipts of the centre.
• The Medium Term Fiscal Plan (MTFP) should be a statement of commitment rather than intent.
• New disclosures have been specified for the Budget/MTFP including on tax expenditure. Public Private Partnership liabilities and the details of variables underlying receipts and expenditure projections.
• Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act needs to specify the nature of shocks that would require relaxation of the targets there under.
• States are expected to be able to get back to their fiscal correction path by 2011-12 and amend their FRBM Acts to the effect.
• State Govt.s are to be eligible for the general performance and special area performance grants only if they comply with the prescribed stipulations in terms of grants to local bodies.
• National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) should be merged with National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) with the state Disaster Response Funds (SDRFs) of the respective states.
• A total non-plan revenue grant of Rs. 51,800 Cr. is recommended over the award period for 8 states. A performance grant of Rs. 15,000 Cr. is recommended for three special category states that have graduated from a non-plan revenue deficit situation.
• An amount of Rs. 19,930 Cr. has been recommended as grant for maintenance of roads and bridges for 4 years (2011-12 to 2014-15).
• An amount of Rs. 24,068 Cr. has been recommended as grant for elementary education.
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• An amount of Rs. 27,945 Cr. has been recommended for state specific needs.
• Amount of Rs. 5000 Cr. each as forest, renewable energy and water sector management grants have been recommended.
• A total sum of Rs. 3, 18, 581 Cr. has been recommended for the award period as Grants in aid to states.
Horizontal Sharing
FC-XIII has used equity and efficiency as two guiding principles while recommending inter se shares of states in tax devolution. The principle of equity addresses the problem of differences in revenue raising capacity and cost disabilities across states. 
Area
Area as a criterion in the devolution formula was first introduced by FC-X on the ground that a state with larger area has to incur additional administrative cost to deliver a comparable standard of service to its citizens. The differences in the cost of providing services may increase with the size of a state but only at a decreasing rate and that beyond a point of incremental cost may become negligible. It is one neutral indicator. Both FC XII and XIII assigned 10% weight age to area.
Fiscal Capacity Distance
In Secondly GSDP estimates presently available are at Factor cost and therefore exclude income, such as that accruing in the form of remittances. The cross state average ratio of Tax to GSDP is higher for general category states than for the special category, where this difference encapsulates the combination of factors underlying the relative fiscal capacity of the two groups. Thus group specific averages are applied to the two categories to obtain a closer approximation to the distance in fiscal capacity between states. FC XIII has assigned 47.5% weightage to fiscal capacity distance criterion as against 50%
assigned by FC XII for per capita income distance.
The use of average tax-GSDP ratio specific to each category neutralizes to an extent the fiscal disadvantage of special category states in terms of tax capacity.
Cost disability governing the norm of devolution conforms to equity based fiscal need, modified by differing cost of service delivery. Cost disability affects both general and special category states. Within the general category there are many states with spatially dispersed human habitations, which raise the cost of equivalent service provision.
Fiscal Discipline
Fiscal discipline as a criterion for tax devolution was used by FC-XI and FC-XII to provide an incentive to states managing their finances prudently. Both the commissions assigned weight of 7.5% to this criterion. The FC-XIII has enhanced this weight to 17.5% emphasizing more on fiscal prudence. The index of fiscal discipline is calculated by relating improvement in the ratio of own revenue receipts of a state to its total revenue expenditure to average ratio across all states.
The own revenue receipts of a state include own tax revenue and thus the criterion of fiscal discipline also captures the tax effort of states. Therefore FC XIII has dropped the application of tax effort as a separate criterion. The combined weight assigned by FC-XII to these two criteria was 15%. There is a strong case to incentivize states following fiscal prudence with thrust on fiscal correction. If all states have improved their respective ratios of own revenue to total revenue expenditure then the states with relatively higher improvement than the average receive higher transfers. Similarly if the ratio has deteriorated in all states, then states with lower deterioration than the average receive higher transfers.
The recommendations on tax devolution are based on the considerations of need, fiscal deficiency and adequate incentivization for better performance.
Equity Efficiency Trade off
FC -XII has undermined the equity aspect as the weight age on fiscal capacity distance has been fixed at 47.5% as against 50% weight assigned to per Capita income distance by FC-XII. FC -XII has assigned greater thrust on efficiency vis-a-vis to that of FC-XII.
How progressive is the Devolution Formula?
An important issue relating to the inter se distribution of tax revenue is the progressiveness of the formula applied for determining the shares of the states. A progressive formula based on equity considerations awards more resources to the poorer states enabling them to overcome the differential in revenue capacity and better meet the needs for public goods and services. The formula introduced by FC -XIII do not appear to adversely affect the degree of progressiveness associated with FC-XII and in fact seem to have marginally improved in terms of gain to low income states. A close examination reveals that FC-XIII award has redistributed away from high and middle income states to low income states as compared to FC-XII awards. 
Notes
• Average devolution is determined over the five year period of each of the FC as projected.
• Comparable GSDP used for 2005-06 and 2006-07, 2007-08 to 2014-15 has been used.
• Comparable GSDP projected over the period 2007-08 to 2014-15 has been used.
From the above table it can be observed that Sikkim having the lowest % of share from FC XIII has the highest differential in terms of average devolution as % of GSDP relative to FC-XII. Gujarat which is loser from FC XIII awards has the lowest differential in terms of average devolution as % of GSDP.
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GRANTS TO LOCAL BODIES
There has been considerable progress in the empowerment of PRIs and Municipalities since the 10 th FC which made a provision for explicitly supporting local bodies through grants, subsequent to the passage of the 73 rd and 74 th amendment to the constitution in 1993. Basis of horizontal distribution of grants to local bodies as per FC XIII has been mentioned in the below table. 
GRANTS-IN-AID
Under Article 275 of the Indian constitution there is provision of transfer of Grants-in-Aid to the State Govt. out of consolidated fund of India. It is an important component of FC transfers. The bulk of the grants has varied from 7.7% of total transfers under FC VII to 26.1% of total transfers under FC-VI, which declined to 18.9% under FC XII. Grants in Aid are an important instrument which enables the commission to make its scheme of transfers more comprehensive and address various issues mentioned in the Terms of Reference. Grants also help in correcting cost disabilities faced by many states which are possible to address only to a limited extent in any devolution formula. Various types of grants are mentioned below.
• Post Devolution Non-Plan Revenue Deficit Grant:-The normatively assessed post devolution (NPRD) for a state signifies the existence of vertical imbalance yet to be corrected and assessed need still to be met. Normative approach has been adopted in assessing the revenue and expenditure of states, which ensures that the assessed deficit is not due to inadequate revenue effort or excessive expenditure by any state. Therefore grants have been Nagaland and Tripura will receive a sum of Rs. 51800 Cr. as NPRD grant under FC XIII.
Performance Incentive
There special category states, Uttrakhand, Assam and Sikkim had received NPRD grants from FC XII to make up for their assessed deficits. These states will receive Rs. 1000 Cr. Rs. 300 Cr. and Rs. 200 Cr. respectively from FC XIII.
These states are eligible to receive grants particularly in view of their known cost disabilities and other fiscal challenges.
Grants for Elementary Education
FC XII had provided grants for the education sector based on the rationale of equalizing expenditure on this sector across states. The grants were fixed on the basis of a two stage normative measure of equalization. In the first stage states with low expenditure Preferences i.e. those states which had a lower exp. on education as a proportion of total revenue expenditure were identified and benchmarked to the average expenditure on education as a proportion of adjusted total revenue expenditure incurred by special and general category states. In the second stage, states which had lower per capita expenditure than the group average even after the adjustment made in the first stage were identified and grants to the extent of 15% of the difference between per capita expenditure of the group were provided. The Ministry of Human Resource 
Grants for Improving Outcomes
Under this head the FC XIII has considered the need to improve the quality of public expenditure to obtain better output and outcome. Three issues have been identified, such as (i) how to ensure that intended expenditure reaches the target group (ii) how to ensure that expenditure contains the right mix of inputs and (iii) how to ensure that the service provider has the required capacity and fully incentivize to provide the service at the desired standard. The first issue is vital as eliminating untargeted groups from the scope of benefits that improves the focus of the programme and reduces exp.
without diluting its intended impact. The second issue is crucial as a service can be provided at an acceptable level only if all its required components are in place and situations like hospitals with doctors but no medicines are overcome. The third issue is important as it deals with the capacity of the service provider to provide the service and his willingness to do so at the desired standard.
Therefore FC-XIII traced out areas such as (i) putting in place an incentive framework to target public exp. 
Incentive for Reducing Infant Mortality
FC XIII intends to incentivize states to improve their HDI for which the focus on improvement in IMR has been made. The SRS measuring IMR for 2009 will be the base line from which improvement of each state's will be measured.
The annual improvement in these indicators as determined from the SRS bulletin/statistical Report for the succeeding years will be measured from the baseline. Each state's eligibility will be determined annually, based upon improvement in IMR index. FC-XII recommended Rs. 5000 Cr. for this grant over a three year period between 2012 and 2015.
Grants -in -Aid to States by FC-XII and FC-XIII has been mentioned in the below table. 
CONCLUSIONS
As equity criterion has been undermined by 2.5% and fiscal discipline has been prioritized by the pro rata The question that may be raised is that if the share of the poorer states in central revenues is enlarged as much as normative approach would require and that of richer states reduced, will that not be discriminatory against the better performing states and thus be detrimental to the growth of the economy. While the argument looks persuasive, it overlooks the possibility that improvement in the regions that are lagging behind may unleash the growth potential of the country. Keeping these regions backward also may not be in the larger interest of the Nation or even the best interest of the states that are already advanced. It would of course not be reasonable to expect all regions to attain the same level of development irrespective of their endowment. However fiscal equalization is imperative to prevent migration lured by better living conditions in the richer states and also as a matter of 'categorical Equity' as Musgrave (1999) insists. The better off states should not complain the flow of larger central funds to the poorer states. The task of fiscal transfer is therefore to provide a level playing field. What is required is not giving less to the poor because they are poor but to contemplate that they improve their efficiency by channelizing the transferred amount properly.
